










Modernization and Social Change in Azerbaijan: Assessing the Transformation of 
Azerbaijan through the Theories of Modernity     
Author(s): Javadbay Khalilzada     
 
To cite this article: Khalilzada, Javadbay (2019) “Modernization and Social Change in 
Azerbaijan: Assessing the Transformation of Azerbaijan through the Theories of Modernity”, 
New Middle Eastern Studies 9 (2), pp. 167-188.   
 




Disclaimer and Copyright 
The NMES editors make every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information contained in the journal. 
However, the Editors and the University of Leicester make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the 
accuracy, completeness or suitability for any purpose of the content and disclaim all such representations and 
warranties whether express or implied to the maximum extent permitted by law. Any views expressed in this 
publication are the views of the authors and not the views of the Editors or the University of Leicester. 
 
Copyright New Middle Eastern Studies, 2019. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 
reproduced, stored, transmitted or disseminated, in any form, or by any means, without prior written permission 
from New Middle Eastern Studies, to whom all requests to reproduce copyright material should be directed, in 
writing.  
 
Terms and Conditions 
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic 
reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to 
anyone is expressly forbidden. 
 
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will 
be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be 
independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, 
proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in 
connection with or arising out of the use of this material.   
New Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (2) 
167 
 
Modernization and Social Change in Azerbaijan: Assessing the 










The socialist development model of the Soviet Union has attracted much scholarly 
attention over the years, but the modernization experiences of singular post-Soviet 
countries (e.g. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan) are rarely discussed. This may 
be because these countries have only recently gained their independence in the early 
1990s and that perhaps most observers are still unsure about their trajectories. This 
study aims to contribute to the literature by examining the case of Azerbaijan in light of 
various influential theories of modernity (i.e. the classical modernization theory, neo-
modernization theory and multiple modernities paradigm). Azerbaijan‟s modernization 
process has been characterized by fluctuations, reversals and various external 
influences over the years. The country first emerged as an independent political entity 
in 1918 and attempted to follow a systematic cultural Westernization and secularization 
program. Yet it was occupied by the Bolshevik Red Army in 1920 and annexed into the 
newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – being forced to conform 
to the top-down socialist development model directed by Moscow for many decades. 
Since gaining its independence once again after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, 
Azerbaijan has operated as a secularist country, faltering to democratize and trying to 
integrate to the global economic system as an energy-producing (i.e. oil and natural 
gas) rentier economy. While Azerbaijan has sought to become part of the so-called 
“Western civilization” via building close ties with Turkey, US, Israel, NATO and the 
EU, the ruling elites in Baku have resisted any calls for democratic reform – not unlike 
the rentier economies of the Middle East such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. This article 
will argue that the complex development track of Azerbaijan provides an appropriate 
case to challenge the hypotheses of the classical modernization and neo-modernization 
theories, while supporting those of the multiple modernities paradigm.                   
 
Keywords: Azerbaijan; Modernization; Social Change; Secularism; Economic Development; 
Democratization           
 
Introduction    
 
Located at the crossroads of the so-called “West” and “East” in the South Caucasus, 
Azerbaijan is the first predominantly Muslim country that established a secular parliamentary 
democratic republic in the Islamic world. Prior to the 1920 invasion by the Bolshevik Red 
Army, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) (1918-1920) had designed and practised a 
democratic institutional and parliamentary system that lasted for about 23 months. Though 
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the vacuum of power that emerged after the collapse of the Russian Empire was the primary 
factor leading to independence, the Azerbaijani society itself – particularly the intellectuals 
and socio-economic elites – had played a significant role in developing a national 
consciousness and distinct identity. Starting from the 1870s, comprehensive social and 
economic reforms were implemented to modernize the Russian Empire via increasing 
industrial production and literacy. The Azerbaijani elites benefited from and used these 
policies to enlighten a predominantly agricultural society – seeking to transform it from a 
traditional Islamic society to a “modern” one inclined towards a western style of state system: 
namely urban, industrial, literate, democratic, and secular.  
The first modernization stage of Azerbaijan can be said to have begun in the mid-1870s 
and lasted until the fall of the ADR in 1920. The Russian Empire applied imperialist policies 
over Azerbaijan and tried to find novel ways to more effectively exploit the natural resources 
of the country. Opposing Russian imperial rule, the nascent local bourgeoisie and 
intellectuals gradually developed a national identity and established new political movements 
for the purpose of resisting the discriminatory and exploitative policies of the Empire. There 
was clearly a dialectical relationship between the gradual emergence of Azerbaijan as a 
political entity and the Russian Empire‟s quasi-colonial rule over the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. The Azerbaijani national identity – not unlike the cases of many other colonized 
peoples around the world – developed in parallel to the deepening of imperialist rule 
throughout the late 19
th
 century, finally culminating with the foundation of the ADR at the 
first sign of a weakness in the imperial centre (i.e. Russia) towards the end of World War I.    
Following the occupation of Azerbaijan by Bolshevik Russia, Azerbaijan came under 
the heavy influence of Soviet modernity. This second stage of Azerbaijan‟s modernization 
experience continued until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. According to Johann Arnason 
(2000: 61), “the Soviet way of development was a failed revolt against [capitalist Western] 
modernity” and Moscow tried to reform the Soviet Union via integrating elements from the 
Western model of modernity such as free speech, the union collapsed entirely. Azerbaijan 
gained its independence and has sought to integrate to the Western world ever since. There 
are studies on the modernization of Azerbaijan written in Russian language from the official 
Soviet socialist perspective during the Soviet rule. However, there is a gap in the literature 
(especially in English) on how the modernization path of the country could be evaluated 
through the perspectives of contending theories of modernity (i.e. the classical modernization 
theory, neo-modernization theory and the multiple modernities paradigm) developed across 
the Western world. Remedying this gap is the main objective of this article.  
As mentioned above, Azerbaijan‟s historical development has evolved in three distinct 
stages over the years. Before the Soviet invasion, Azerbaijan was a quasi-colony of the 
Russian Empire and this period was followed by approximately two years of independence. It 
is necessary to examine this historical period in this study in order to effectively understand 
the beginning of the country‟s transformation and highlights its differences from the Soviet 
model that dominated the trajectory of Azerbaijan for much of the 20
th
 century. The final 
stage of Azerbaijan‟s modernization trajectory begins after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and continues at the present. Thus, we will seek to understand the continuities and breaks 
within the unique route of Azerbaijan‟s modernization since the 1870s. We will also seek to 
explain the character of Azerbaijani modernity today, discussing its similarities with and 
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divergences from the Western modernity model and the models of other non-Western 
societies. The following section of the article introduces and comparatively analyses the 
arguments of the three theories of modernity utilized in this study. This will establish the 
conceptual framework of this study. Then, we will examine the modernization experience of 
Azerbaijan to reflect back on the hypotheses of these theories in light of empirical data 
obtained from the Azerbaijan case.         
 
Debating Modernity: Contending Approaches to Modernization  
With the decolonisation process gaining steam after World War II, modernization studies 
attracted the interest of social scientists from various academic disciplines such as sociology, 
economics, political science, and international relations. As a result of the earlier studies in 
the late 1940s and 1950s, a multi-disciplinary approach known as the “classic modernization 
theory” (CMT) emerged and dominated the academic discourse until the 1970s (So 1990; 
Göksel 2015a: 72-99). CMT was the first holistic approach that defined modernity and put 
forward indicators to differentiate the concepts of “modern” from and “non-modern”. 
Adopting a positivist/progressivist reading of human history, CMT argues that all the 
traditional characteristics of a society would gradually be replaced by modern ones (So 1990: 
33-34; Erkilet 2007: 108-138; Göksel 2017: 147-148). Modernization is generally perceived 
to be a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity 
(Huntington 1968: 32). This multifaceted process could be explained as an expansion of 
scientific and technological knowledge, industrialization, urbanization, a mass consumption 
society, secularization, institutional centralization, legalization and democratization (Lerner 
1958; Levy 1968; Apter 1965; Huntington 1968; Rostow 1960). 
Modernization refers to the transformation of a society from a “traditional” state of 
affairs to a supposedly “modern” one which is generally also assumed to be far superior to 
the former (Göksel 2018a). To illustrate the distinctions between the modern and the 
traditional, CMT scholars defined three inter-related processes of transformation: social 
development, economic development, and political development. These three were seen as 
the “holy trinity” of modernization (Huntington 1968: 33-34; So 1990: 33–34; Escobar 1995; 
Levy 1968; Zapf 2004:2). According to CMT, these features are the main characteristics of 
modernity, but they can be diversified. Development in social fields reflects the elimination 
of traditional practices and their replacement with supposedly more “rational” ones. The 
influence of mythical and religious beliefs decreases via secularization. Political development 
results in the formation of centralized state structures, the institutionalization of formal/legal 
decision-making mechanisms, and democratization. Parallel to these, economic development 
means the mechanization of manufacturing, industrialization, and urbanization. Overall, 
CMT defines a predominantly secularized, urbanized, industrialized, and liberal democratic 
society as an ideal “modern society” (Turner 1984: 3). 
CMT scholars have consistently argued that there is a positive correlation between the 
aforementioned three development processes and that each one of these fortify the other two. 
The positive correlation between these characteristics enables the achievement of a modern 
society and this was defined as a “positive feedback loop” (Lerner 1958; Apter 1965; Zapf 
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2004: 2; Göksel 2018b, 2016). The so-called positive feedback loop has been defined by Dale 
F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (1996: 23) as follows: 
 
Economic specialization, it was argued, leads to political institutionalization; and the 
displacement of traditional, usually landed, elites by urban middle classes leads to the 
emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic, and educational structures. 
According to this formulation of modernization theory, superstition wanes and religion 
recedes from a role in public life. The religious establishment comes to be seen as 
resistant to change. As the civic order becomes secularized, “rational” conduct becomes 
the norm, and this leads to greater political participation or, at the least, political stability. 
 
CMT‟s understanding of modernity has been mainly inferred through the examining the 
development paths of Western societies such as France, Britain and the US. Therefore, 
modernization was generally assumed as a Westernization process (So 1990). Whenever non-
Western countries launched some reforms and modernization processes, like Turkey and Iran 
in the 19
th
 century, they were expected to – and aimed to – resemble their Western 
counterparts. The more they resembled the West, more they would be classified as “modern” 
by observers (Göksel 2015a, 2016). On the whole, modernization seemed to CMT scholars as 
a direct rupture from tradition. Whenever a modernization process was initiated, it would be 
impossible to go back and to retain characteristics of traditional lifestyles. So regardless of 
variants within the broad school of thought classified as CMT, CMT scholars essentially 
emphasized the dichotomy of “tradition” and “modernity” (Apter 1965: 7, So 1990: 33-34; 
Berberoglu 1992: 8). It asserts that traditional and modern features of lifestyle are 
incompatible and cannot co-exist in the same realm/space. 
Over the years, many critics have focused on the Eurocentric nature of the framework 
of the CMT based on understanding modernization as unidirectional, irreversible, linear, and 
sharp contrasting approaches towards “tradition” and “modernity”. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
some schools of thought such as dependency theory, world-system theory, and the neo-
modernization theory (NMT) strongly questioned the validity of CMT. Since the arguments 
raised by the dependency theory and the world-system theory are more related to the 
international economic system as a whole – thus less related to this study‟s objective – we 
shall focus more on NMT in detail in the following sections.   
Developments in the Western world and notable non-Western countries throughout the 
1970s and 1980s illustrated that the global modernization process was not occurring as CMT 
imagined. According to NMT scholars, a clear-cut transition from tradition to modernity does 
not represent reality, modernization is not linear, and cultural change does not move in a 
straight line (Bernstein 1971: 146; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 33-35). In the context of East 
Asia, traditional and religious values have been argued to have strongly contributed to 
political and economic development; in fact people could not totally abandon their traditions 
and some elements of tradition co-exist with modernity (So 1990; Zapf 2004: 4, Wagner 
2012). According to Banuazizi (1987), tradition can be as reflective, creative, and responsive 
to individual and collective needs as its modern counterpart. Tradition has immense potential 
for social mobilization and change. In contrast to the argument that tradition prevents 
development, it has been argued (Wong 1988; Davis 1987; Banuazizi 1987) that, in some 
contexts, traditional values actually contribute towards modern development. Wong (1988: 
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142) demonstrates that traditional Chinese family industry has no negative effects on 
economic development and vice versa. Kinship, in reality, supports economic development:   
 
There exists a much stronger measure of trust among jia (family) members than among 
unrelated business partners; consensus is easier to attain; the need mutual accountability 
is reduced. These factors enable family firms to be more adaptable in their operations. 
They can make quick decisions during rapidly changing circumstances and maintain 
greater secrecy by committing less to written records. As a result, they are particularly 
well-suited to survive and flourish in situations where a high level of risk is involved. 
 
The emerging influence of religious groups and conservative political movements around the 
world in the post-1980 period also demonstrated that the secularization process could not 
entirely eliminate religious beliefs and traditional values as predicted earlier by CMT. 
Besides the increasing involvement of religious groups among political movements in the 
Muslim-majority Middle East countries (e.g. Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan and Iran), there was 
also a resurgence of religiosity in the US, a Western society, as Evangelical churches and 
communities have steadily increased their cultural and political influence since the early 
1980s and also formed a key foothold within the Republican Party. It is clear that 
secularization not only fails to wipe out religious beliefs in the semi-modern/developing 
countries but also in the “most advanced” Western nations. Despite the firm suppression of 
religion in the officially atheist USSR, religion also survived across its vast territories. From 
the 1980s onwards, in fact, its position in the state and society strengthened (Shubin 2006).   
Unsurprisingly, NMT scholars have built their arguments around a criticism of the 
irreversible secularization hypothesis of CMT. In an influential study, for instance, Davis 
(1987) illustrates how religion has contributed towards the modern development of Japan. In 
contrast to the CMT argument that religion prevents development at the same time as 
modernity, Davis discusses the functional or legitimating role of religion, and how religion 
itself has been transformed in order to accommodate its new role in an urban consumer 
society. However, despite their difference of opinion over the role of religion and tradition in 
a modern society, NMT also accepted some of the ideas raised by CMT. For instance, with 
the collapse of the USSR – the main rival of the West – NMT scholars once again 
popularized the tired CMT hypothesis that there cannot be any other modernity model 
beyond the liberal democratic and capitalist modernity of the West (Fukuyama 1992). NMT 
scholars such as Francis Fukuyama have in fact breathed new life into the convergence thesis 
of CMT which long assumed that the Western modernity is universal, thus equally applicable 
to all societies around the globe. Moreover, NMT also contends that social, political and 
economic developments occur concurrently and “feed on” one another (Inglehart and Welzel 
2005; Göksel 2016).  
Challenging the Eurocentric approaches and such exclusive models of modernization 
raised by CMT and NMT, the multiple modernities paradigm (MMP) is a relatively new 
approach that began to receive acclaim from the early 1990s onwards. MMP‟s main argument 
is that “Westernization” cannot possibly be the only path to, and form of, modernity 
(Eisenstadt 2000; Wittrock 2000; Wagner 2000, 2008). MMP studies concentrate on how 
different states/nations understand modernity and how they practice it within radically 
different settings under divergent circumstances. In contrast to CMT and NMT, MMP 
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assumes that there is not one kind of modernity and that it is not a necessity for non-Western 
states to follow the Western path in order to be “modern” (Göksel 2016). In addition, it 
argues, in fact, that there was never one kind of modernity – even in Europe (Eisenstadt 2000, 
2003, Silva and Mónica Brito Vieira 2009; Işıksal and Göksel 2018: 46-48). MMP scholars 
believe in the possibility of different paths to modernity beyond the singular perception of 
human evolution defined by CMT and NMT – both of which they accuse of being 
Eurocentric (Eisenstadt 1996; Wagner 2000; Wittrock 2002; Schmidt 2006; Fourie 2012). 
MMP re-conceptualizes modernity as a more comprehensive process with Western modernity 
being but one of the various possible ways (Lee 2006; Göksel 2016). The concept of 
modernization is defined by MMP as “a process of systemic changes” for which its “direction 
and results cannot be predicted” (Eisenstadt 2000: 3). As Kaya (2004: X) states:  
 
The concept of later modernities suggests that there have been multiple ways to 
modernity and that those multiple ways give rise to multiple consequences. These 
consequences do not converge anywhere, neither under the label of liberal democracy nor 
under that of communist society. 
 
According to MMP, characteristics which emerged in Western countries as features of 
modernity (industrialization, urbanization, democratic statehood institutions, secular society) 
that were used as the measurement for evaluating societies as “modern” and “unmodern” are 
no longer valid. At the present time, nearly all societies possess these features in different 
forms. Moreover, as Eisenstadt (2000: 2) argues, some states use the economic features in the 
same way as in the Western world; however, they do not construct liberal democratic 
political institutions. In this context, MMP argues that characteristics modern societies adopt 
can vastly differ according to the society and their cultural worldview (Schmidt 2006: 80). 
When it comes to comparing various industrialized and democratic countries, 
significant differences emerge. For instance, liberal capitalism is peculiar to Anglo-American 
societies but Japan and Germany have a more statist/non-liberal type of capitalism. 
Differences are not only in economy and political life, but can also be seen in the fields of 
science, education, medicine and so on. Each country has its own track of modernization that 
developed as a result of particular historical, social, and regional factors. Even two 
neighbouring countries, such as Germany and France, have different practices and 
experiences of modernity. Until World War I, virtually no European country had the type of 
political order that classic modernist scholars defined as emblematic of modernity (Wittrock 
2002: 35). According to Schmidt (2006), it is clear that there are varieties of modernity. 
Modernization continues to develop and changes its assumptions in course of time.  
The post-1980 development trajectories of some non-Western countries such as China, 
Russia, and Turkey have strengthened MMP‟s hypothesis (Kaya 2004; Göksel 2018b, 2019). 
MMP puts forward a distinct framework to define modernity: a modern society is one that 
has experienced a process of transformation in the fields of political, economic and social 
development (Wagner 2012: 10). However, in contrast to the claims of CMT and NMT, 
which are known as the “holy trinity” – i.e. the necessary positive correlation of social, 
economic, and political development – MMP illustrates a flexible correlation between these 
characteristics (see Table 1). Developments such as democratization, industrialization, 
gender equality, literacy, urbanization and secularization do not necessarily happen 
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concurrently, do not need to reinforce each other and that they follow a varied trajectory in 
different countries (Kaya 2004). Moreover, MMP assumes that modernization is an ongoing 
process and that this ongoing process does not mean that it will be better than the previous 
one. It is an ongoing process according to multiple modernities and it consists of unexpected 
upheavals (Eisenstadt 2000; Wagner 2000, 2012).  
In the following section, the study will analyse the social, economic, and political 
development trajectories of Azerbaijan while reflecting on the aforementioned arguments of 
the three rival theories of modernity.  
 
Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Theories of Modernity 
                                                                                                       Theories  
Concepts                          Classic Modernization                     Neo-Modernization              
                                                             
                Multiple Modernities  
Modernity Economic, social, and political 
development:  strong 
correlation. 
Economic, social and political 
development: strong correlation. 
Economic, social and political 
development, without a strong 
correlation between them.  
Features of modern 
society 
Capitalist, secular, liberal 
democracy 
(Modernity and is equated with 
“westernization”) 
Capitalist liberal democracy 
(Modernity is equated with 
“westernization”) 
Many possible modernities: (e.g. 
socialist, authoritarian etc.) 
Idea of Progress Unidirectional progress: (e.g. 
“irreversible secularization 
thesis” 
Development is not 
unidirectional, it could regress 
and collapse.  Some traditional 
features support development. 
Development is not unidirectional, it 
could regress and collapse.  Some 




Positive feedback loop  between 
democratization, social and 
economic development 
Positive feedback loop between 
democratization, social and 
economic development 
No feedback loop between 
development processes are possible 
Religion  Complete secularization of 
society is necessary for 
modernity 
A religious interpretation that 
positively portrays capitalism and 
democracy is sufficient (i.e. 
Protestant ethics, Islamic 
Calvinism)  
Social development in terms of 
secularization or ideological 
moderation of religious groups is not 
an absolute requisite for modernity 
Islam Incompatible with modernity Is compatible with democracy and 
capitalism depending on 
interpretation 
As there are many “modernities”, there 
are also many “Islamism”, some of 
which are compatible with modernity 
Source: Göksel (2016: 249).   
 
The Energy-Driven Early Modernization of Azerbaijan: Economic and Political 
Changes 
It is a fact that Azerbaijan possesses rich natural resources. At the present, oil and natural gas 
contribute towards nearly 75% of Azerbaijan‟s state revenues and around 50% of the GDP 
(Göksel 2015b). As a site of one of the earliest known oilfields in the world, Baku has gained 
a notable reputation for oil production from the last quarter of the 19
th
 century onwards. After 
the abolition of serfdom in Azerbaijan in 1870 and the replacement of the monopoly system 
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by the auction of oil-fields to private owners, from 1872 onwards, the oil industry started to 
rapidly develop. The discovery of new rich oil lands in the 1870-74 period popularized the 
Baku oil industry. Additionally, Russian and Western investors such as the Nobel Brothers 
and the Rothschild family invested in the oil industry of Azerbaijan. 
Indicators show how fast the Baku oil industry developed in the last quarter of the 19
th
 
century: from the 1870s to the turn of the 20
th
 century, the Baku oil industry grew in output 
(to its peak in 1901) and in the size of its labour force. Output rose from approximately 
14,300 barrels (bbl) in 1872 to approximately 70,600,000 (almost 200,000 bbl/day) in the 
peak year 1901; more than the combined production of all the US fields for that year (Altstadt 
1992). The industry also caused an increase in labour force. The number of oil workers 
increased from 1,254 in 1883 to 27,673 in 1901 (Altstadt 1992: 22). 
Transportation, railroads, and shipping were developed alongside the oil industry. 
Baku‟s oldest rail line was built in 1880 to connect cities with the oil districts. In 1884, the 
Transcaucasian Railway was built to transport oil to the Black Sea. It ran from Baku to 
Batumi via Ganja and Tiflis and this railway also contributed to the economic life of passing 
districts. The number of ships on the Caspian Sea more than quadrupled between 1887 and 
1899. The first Bank, the branch of state bank was opened in 1880 (Altstadt 1992; 
Suleymanov 2001). Baku was the fastest developing urban centre of the Caucasus and was 
rapidly transforming from a traditional town towards a multi-dimensional fully-industrialized 
city. According to Suleymanov (2001), as a result of Russian imperial industrialization, 
urbanization increased and 35% of the Azerbaijani population began to live in urban areas at 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century on the eve of the 1917 Revolution. 
Economic and social development created a pluralist society and government structure 
in Azerbaijan. The Russian imperial policy had banned Muslim members to become the 
majority in the City Council, with non-Christians being allowed only to constitute one-third 
of council members. However, the Azerbaijani intelligentsia strongly resisted this rule and 
began to participate in elections in 1908.  Despite the repressive legal system and opposition 
from the Russian-appointed viceroy, the City Council gradually fell under the control of 
Azerbaijani Turks. They ignored demands for new elections and remained the majority until 
the end of the Russian Empire (Altstadt 1992; Seyidzada 1999; Ismayılov 2007; Zerdablı 
2008). The emergent political institutionalization of the Azerbaijani nation was concluded 
with the establishment of the first secular state in the Muslim world, as the Azerbaijan 
Democratic Republic (ADR) declared its independence in 1918 after the collapse of the 
Russian Empire.  
The ADR suffered from acute political instability and had five coalition governments 
within two years, but it successfully reached its objective of receiving formal recognition as a 
de facto sovereign nation-state by European powers in January 1920 at the Paris Peace 
Conference. The ADR was a turning point for the political modernization of Azerbaijan as its 
brief spell of independence later became a key reference point when the Soviet Union began 
to crumble in the late 1980s. The ADR‟s official statement of independence declared 
(Altstadt 1992: 89-90): 
 
Sovereign rights belong to the Azerbaijani people. From this perspective, it is a 
democratic republic and it follows… Independent Azerbaijan is a democratic republic… 
New Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (2) 
175 
 
All citizens are guaranteed full civil and political rights regardless of their nationality, 
religion (the only mention of religion in this declaration), social position, or sex. 
 
As such, the foundational document of the ADR granted all rights that citizens already 
possess in contemporary democratic states, and the political system of ADR was defined as a 
secular, multi-party parliamentary government. The ADR also provided universal suffrage to 
its population regardless of ethnic identity and gender. Thus, the ADR was the first state that 
recognized the suffrage of women in the Muslim world. The leading party of the state was the 
Musavat under the leadership of Mahammad Emin Rasulzade. Besides Musavat, there were 
four other parties, the Hummet, Ittihad, Ahrar and the Socialist Blocks of Muslims. The 
parliament was multi-ethnic and minorities had representatives, with division being as 
follows; 80 of 125 deputies were Azerbaijani, 21 Armenian, 10 Russian, 3 places for big 
companies which invested in Baku oil and 1 seat per minority groups, namely Polish, 
Georgians, and Jews (İsmayılov and Nigar Maksvel 2008: 284-285).  
In the case of Azerbaijan, it can be clearly seen that oil-industry led economic 
development triggered or accelerated political development (in the form of nation-state 
formation) as CMT and NMT assume. The rich energy sources provided economic power to 
the emergent political entity in the country, and its potential as a global energy provider was 
also influential to ensure its diplomatic recognition by European powers. Economic 
development also led to social change. A philanthropic local bourgeoisie (e.g. Hagı 
Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, Murtuza Mukhtarov, Shamsi Asadullayev, and Yusif Aga Dadashov) 
channelled significant resources towards the institutionalization of the Azerbaijani state as 
well as social development in the form of establishing education institutions across the 
country. Numerous secular schools, newspapers and political parties were founded with the 
support of the Azerbaijani bourgeoisie in the years preceding the ADR‟s foundation as well 
as during its two year independent rule.  
However, Azerbaijan‟s independent modernization experience was cut short with the 
Bolshevik invasion of 1920 – leading to an extremely traumatic totalitarian rule for seven 
decades and the implementation of the top-down socialist modernization project. Most of the 
Azerbaijani intellectuals and bourgeoisie were executed by Soviet authorities in the years 
following the 1920 invasion and as a result of mass collectivization (especially during the 
Stalinist period); all private possession was seized by the state. All economic and political 
governance were managed by Moscow and the member states‟ roles (e.g. Azerbaijan) were to 
meet the goals and whims of central planning. The political secretary of the Azerbaijani 
Communist Party was appointed by Moscow, and the secretaries had to meet the central 
planning and satisfy it. Since the socialist model of development of the Soviet Union has 
been studied exhaustively and due to lack of space in this work, we do not examine this 
period in detail beyond a brief look at its overall impact on Azerbaijan‟s trajectory. It is 
important to note that until the 1970s, Azerbaijan‟s natural resources were exploited in the 
name of the USSR‟s so-called “brotherhood economy”. For instance, in the mid-1930s, the 
territory of Azerbaijan produced approximately 60 to 70% of the entire Soviet oil production 
and the Soviet Union became the second country in world in oil extraction. Towards the end 
of the 1930s, Azerbaijan began to produce more than 70% of oil extraction in the USSR 
(Suleymanov 2001). Moreover, Azerbaijan provided around 75% of all the USSR‟s and 
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around 85-90% of plane oil needs during the war years (Aras and Suleymanov 2010; 
Qaffarov 2008: 10-15). Thus, it should come as no surprise that Azerbaijan was one of the 
top targets that Nazi Germany aimed to – yet failed to – occupy during its invasion of Soviet 
Union in World War 2.    
When Azerbaijan obtained its independence as a result of the collapse of the USSR in 
1991, natural resources once again determined the destiny of the political and social life of 
Azerbaijan. According to Nuri Aras and Elchin Suleymanov (2011), Azerbaijan was one of 
the few states in the USSR that was economically ready for independence. However, 
unexpected factors negatively damaged Azerbaijani economic and political life in the 1990s: 
the war with Armenia over the Mountainous Karabakh, border troubles between former 
Soviet member states (e.g. Georgia, Russia and Ukraine) and a massive internal political 
instability within Azerbaijan. The war with Armenia took on a new form resembling an 
ongoing “cold war” after the ceasefire in 1994 and political stability was achieved in late 
1995 (Cornell 2011). Early instability and war led to a massive economic failure in the early 
to mid-1990s.  
From the late 1990s onwards, new lucrative contracts to export resources to the 
European market were signed and the establishment of political stability brought considerable 
economic development, however, the country has since faced significant problems. As Table 
2 shows, the country achieved a degree of welfare only after the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. The urbanization rate is still not very high in Azerbaijan, as 55% 
of the population live in cities, in comparison to modernized countries.
1
 Azerbaijan could be 
seen as a developing country in terms of most of its economic indicators. Though the literacy 
rate is very high at 99%,
2
 the country has problems in terms of transferring human capital to 
economic capital. Azerbaijan has concentrated on developing an independent economic 
policy and statehood which took a long time and this process still continues. Although the 
country achieved stability, the Azerbaijan economy is considered to be in transition and could 
not yet liberalize its economy and the country is not a member of the WTO (Suleymanov 
2001; Ismayılov 2007; Aras and Suleymanov 2010).  
The main problem of contemporary Azerbaijan in terms of economic development 
appears to be the lack of diversification. Industrialization is heavily concentrated in the oil 
and oil-related sectors of the country and other sectors are still under-developed. The 
Azerbaijani economy is entirely dependent on the global oil price. With the decline in oil 
prices beginning from 2014, the country has faced 100% devaluation on its currency in 2015. 
According to Transparency International, Azerbaijan is one of the most corrupt states with a 
rank of around 120 out of 168 countries examined in the study.
3
 The corrupt state 
bureaucracy does not let the private economy to develop. However, undoubtedly petrodollars 
have contributed to the development of economic and social life as Table 2 shows. 
Nevertheless, the overall state of Azerbaijan‟s economic life resembles that of potentially 
unsustainable rentier economies of the Middle East region (e.g. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
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1994 200 2001 790 2008 5410 
1995 320 2002 830 2009 4880 
1996 420 2003 880 2010 5800 
1997 510 2004 1050 2011 7000 
1998 540 2005 1580 2012 7490 
1999 510 2006 2380 2013 7800 
2000 620 2007 3480 2014 7800 
Source: Azerbaijan State Statistic Institution (2014) 
 
The post-independence economic development of the country since 1991 has not contributed 
to political development in the form of democratization as CMT and NMT assume. Although 
Abulfaz Elchibey‟s Popular Front was democratic and attempted to build a liberal 
democratic governance system, the Popular Front administration could not manage to stay in 
power for long. Due to ineffective bureaucratic control, it completely lost control over the 
economy and the security services, and a military coup caused a government change (Cornell 
2001, 2011; Guliyev 2005; Ergun 2010). Following Elchibey‟s downfall, Heydar Aliyev – 
the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (1969-1982) during the Soviet rule 
– rose to power and consolidated his rule until his death in 2002. His son, Ilham Aliyev, 
replaced him after winning the election in 2003. Heydar Aliyev had focused on building 
stability in the country and some scholars interpret that democratization was not his concern 
under the extra-ordinary circumstances following the disastrous war with Armenia (Rasizade 
2003; Guliyev 2005; Cornell 2011).  Heydar Aliyev himself explained his understanding of 
democracy as a “long-term process” as follows: 
   
Some people think we should be able to establish democracy in a short time, but that is 
impossible. Azerbaijan is a young nation and democracy is new a concept. The United States 
has been advancing on the path of democracy for a long time – more than 200 years. You 
have achieved a lot, but you are still working on it. Democracy is not an apple you buy at the 
market and bring back home.
4 
 
Ilham Aliyev also followed his father‟s policies and the main goal of his government has 
been to achieve political stability and economic development. Aliyev stated that “all 
freedoms are protected in Azerbaijan. The freedom of speech and freedom of the press are 
fully provided. There is free internet in Azerbaijan. The freedom of assembly is fully 
guaranteed”.5 Indeed, according to Cornell, “President Ilham Aliyev was interested in 
economic development of Azerbaijan more than political development. Azerbaijan was a 
fast-growing country with the world‟s highest rate of GDP growth from 2006 to 2009”.6 
Alongside accelerating the economic growth rates, Ilham Aliyev has also attempted to 
decrease the high corruption level and eliminate bureaucratic red tape in the country. For 
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instance, in 2012, the “Asan Xidmət” (Easy Service) was established to develop public 
services and eliminate corruption. He has repeatedly proclaimed that stability and gradual 
development, rather than sudden political changes, is the way forward for Azerbaijan‟s 
salvation.
7 
In contrast to Aliyev‟s perception of Azerbaijan as a democracy, the Freedom House 
Index and numerous scholars (Cornell 2011; Guliyev 2012; Bedeford 2014) define the regime 
in Azerbaijan as authoritarian. In this context, the CMT and NMT‟s shared hypothesis that 
notable economic development (i.e. industrialization and the emergence of highly educated 
urban middle class) leads to democratization is not valid in the Azerbaijani case. Azerbaijan 
has one of the highest literacy rates in the world, and – starting from the mid-2000s – the 
country achieved very high economic growth rates. However, this has not lead to any form of 
notable public demand for democratization so far. In fact, not unlike in the Arab Gulf states 
such as Saudi Arabia, oil-driven economic development has consolidated authoritarianism. In 
this context, MMP‟s hypothesis is more appropriate to the Azerbaijani case. MMP argues that 
authoritarian countries also could be economically modern and that economic development 
does not necessarily correlate with any form of democratization at the present or in the future. 
The case of Azerbaijan perfectly fits the hypothesis of MMP as such a type of 
“modernization without democratization” continues in the country.  
 
The Social Transformation of Azerbaijan: State-Religion Relations   
 
Beginning in the 1850s and the 1860s, a new secular education system appeared in 
predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan. Pioneers of this type of education were local intellectuals 
such as Abbaskulu Aga Bakukhanlı (1794-1846), Mirza Feth Ali Akhundzade (1812-1878), 
Seyyid Azim Shirvani (1835-1888), Hasan Melikzade Zerdabi (1837-1907), and Najafbay 
Vazirov (1854-1926). Most of them were educated in secular schools in Russia or co-
operated with them. However, the local Muslim conservatives were not eager to enrol their 
children in secular schools and their scope remained restricted to small secularist circles with 
close cultural and economic ties to Russia and Europe.   
The main turning point of the social transformation of the Azerbaijanis was the 
introduction of newspapers. The first newspaper published in the Azerbaijani Turkish 
language was “Ekinci” (the Cultivator). “Ekinci” made its first publication on 4 August 1875 
and it was a pioneer in Azerbaijani intellectual and press history that contributed to the 
education and modernization of the country. Following Ekinci, Ziya and Ziya-i Caucasus 
(1879-1884) and Keshkul (1883-1891) also devoted their writings to religious and education 
reforms and they promoted to society the importance of education and enlightenment 
(Swietochowski 1985; Altstadt 1992).  
The bourgeoisie also supported the modernization and development process of 
Azerbaijan and its national identity. Philanthropic bourgeoisies such as Hagı Zeynalabdin 
Taghiyev, Murtuza Mukhtarov, Shamsi Asadullayev, and Yusif Aga Dadashov were sponsors 
of newspapers, journals, and schools. For instance, in the Muslim world, the first modern 
secular school for girls was opened in Baku in 1901 with the direct financial support of 
Tagiyev. These bourgeoisies also were the leading figures of national capital and 
industrialization. It is noteworthy to mention that both the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie 
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class had experienced the discriminatory policy of the Russian Empire; hence, they 
consolidated their resistance against the Empire and their local collaborators by uniting their 
power.  
On the verge of World War I, there were several newspapers and journals that played a 
significant role in Azerbaijani political and social life. Newspapers such as Kaspi, Molla 
Nasreddin, Həyat, Teraqqi, Füyuzat, Shelale, Achıg Söz debated issues such as the 
Azerbaijani language, national identity formation, education programs, civil society, religion, 
and the need to obtain equal rights with Russians and Christians within the Empire. Ali 
Mardan Topchibashi, Mirza Alekper Sabir, Jalil Memedguluzade, Mahammad Emin 
Rasulzade, Nariman Narimanov, as well as other intellectuals, were active writers in the 
Azerbaijani press and resisted the Russian colonial policy and emphasized education and 
progress. For instance, the Molla Nasreddin journal, like its namesake, whose feigned 
foolishness masked wisdom, used elliptical language, ambiguity, satire, and cartoons against 
officialdom, religious conservatives, the unthinking person, and the corrupt bureaucrat. Molla 
Nasreddin and other such newspapers were tools examining the role of women in a traditional 
Muslim society (Altstadt 1992: 58). The slogan of development in Azerbaijani society was 
expressed by Alibey Huseyinzada: “Be inspired by the Turkish way of life, to worship God in 
accordance with the Muslim religion, and to adapt present-day European civilization”, which 
later was conceptualized as “Türkleshmek, Islamlashmak, Avrupalashmak” (Altstadt 1992: 
70). 
The Azerbaijani intellectuals were not against Islam and adopted it as one of the crucial 
elements to establish an Azerbaijani national identity. In the declaration of the founding party 
of the ADR, Musavat (Equality) Party, Islam was defined as one of the fundamental pillars of 
the Azerbaijani identity. At the same time, it was also emphasized that Musavat respect every 
ethnicity and religion without any discrimination. In the 1917 publication of the declaration 
in Musavat newspaper, it was stated that “the first element which creates humanity and 
humankind is its nationality, however, religion is an inseparable element of humankind, as 
Musavat we declare that national and religious equality will be sustained” (Goyushov 1997: 
35). Subsequent to its independence, Musavat declared Azerbaijan a republic and a secular 
country. They did not prevent people from performing their religious duties and values. 
Azerbaijan was a secular country and it allowed all religious groups to perform their religious 
duties (Ismayılov & Maksvell 2008). 
Art and literature offered another way to educate the people and adopt “European” 
modern culture. The Azerbaijanis composed operas, ballets, and other works based on the 
classics of Turkish language literature and folk traditions and/or Islamic culture. Uzeir and 
Jeyhun Hajibeyli Brothers, at the end of 1907, wrote the libretto for Uzeir‟s opera, Leyla and 
Majnun, the first opera of the Islamic East (Altstadt 1992: 54). All these development of this 
period can be assessed as the “mini enlightenment” and the first crucial step in the social 
modernization of Azerbaijan.  
As mentioned above, CMT assumes that religiosity would gradually vanish with the 
development of science and technology, however the Azerbaijani case is different and thus 
the CMT is not valid here. The Azerbaijani intellectuals acknowledged religion as one of the 
determining features of national identity. In this case, NMT‟s hypothesis that in some cases 
religion could play a supporting role for modernization and development is valid in the 
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Azerbaijani case where religion was accepted as one of the pillars of Azerbaijani identity. In 
addition, secular education, equal rights of women with men, and the enlightenment of 
society were priorities of Azerbaijani intellectuals that demonstrate a universal and modern 
approach to mankind.  
With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the development and modernization of the 
country was abruptly halted. The new system was not keen on continuing the natural bottom-
up development of the society – which had begun in the 1870s. The Soviet system annihilated 
the bourgeois class, intelligentsia, and the top administration members of the ADR. With the 
korenizatiisa policy, the Communist Party intended to cut all ties with the past and build a 
new Soviet generation that was not affected by Islamic, Pan-Turkic or capitalist ideas and 
would instead embrace the official communist Marxist-Leninist ideology and lead the society 
on this way instead. To achieve its objectives, the USSR applied atheism in cultural and 
education systems. It should be noted that the USSR was successful in increasing the literacy 
rate of society, however, the system was not a natural evolution but instead a forced way of 
development that ultimately failed to fully eradicate religious practice as – it was pushed to 
underground instead (Settarov 1964: 120; Ehedov 1995: 153-158; Quliyev 2008: 275-280). 
According to Alexandre Benningsen (1984: 6-9), the Soviets applied three aspects of 
secularization: 
 
First, almost complete but not total disappearance of the religious Islamic establishment. 
The means used to obtain this goal are propaganda and administrative measures. Second, 
part of “secularization” strategy is the accelerated modernization of the society through 
sedentization, and it caused deaths of numerous people. Third, social engineering, which 
was carried out in the Muslim territories by physical elimination between 1928 and 1941 
of the entire pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie or aristocratic elite and its replacement by a 
completely new elite of popular, mainly peasant origin. 
 
During the USSR period, the system tried to build its idealized Soviet citizen, therefore all 
aspects of personal and social life was controlled by the totalitarian system. Atheism was a 
state policy so religion was restricted. The education system was adjusted according to this 
ideological outlook. Economic life was focused to meet the central planning system. The 
Soviet period could be seen as a leap from a “traditional” society to an industrial one by force 
but it was an artificial experiment and it failed as Arnason (2000) notes in his exhaustive 
study on the Soviet modernization program.  
The Azerbaijani society once again began to experience a new way of transformation 
after 1991. After independence, establishing centralized government and stability took time 
in Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict turned to an intense war between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. There were nearly one million Internally Displaced People (IDP) 
across the country, which created a massive social problem for the fledgling Republic. 
During this complicated period, there were a lot of demonstrations in Azerbaijan and some 
Shi‟a groups raised the portraits of Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini and green flags of the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. These acts were interpreted as an attempt to establish an Islamic 
government resembling the theocratic Iranian Islamic Republic in Azerbaijan (Hasanov 2011: 
197-99). However, subsequent developments demonstrated that, as was the case at the 
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beginning of the 20
th
 century, Azerbaijan would continue as a secular state and that the social 
base of and Islamic state has remained very weak.  
According to the Constitution, Azerbaijan is secular; it recognizes freedom of religion 
and consent for people to explicitly practice and propagate their beliefs. According to 
records, after the first decade of independence, over 1,300 mosques were built or renovated 
and opened for prayers (Abbasov 2014: 156). Currently, there are over 1,800 registered 
mosques operating in Azerbaijan.
8 
For 70 years, Azerbaijan was under the strict control of the communist-atheist Soviets, 
but the country began to witness an Islamic revival to some extent since 1991. There are three 
main groups of countries from which Islamic ideologies have been imported: the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, ethnic kin/relative and neighbour Turkey, and Arab states such as Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Due to its historical and cultural relations, initially Iran tried to 
propagate Shi‟a Islam into Azerbaijan. However, Motika (2001: 114) argues that because of 
social and political circumstances, Iran has restricted influence. Turkey also exports religion 
through educational institutions, which is also restricted because at the social base, the 
Azerbaijani people are not inclined to be very devout. The third way, i.e. the Arab/Wahhabi 
Islam has also restricted influence because it is not the traditional way of Islam that 
Azerbaijanis have practiced.  
At the present, Azerbaijan illustrates a rare example of state where Shi‟a and Sunni 
people co-exist peacefully and practice their religious duties together. However, the Shi‟a and 
Sunni believers only consist approximately 5% of the population. Although the rest of the 
population (95%) is Muslim, they do not practice the daily duties of Islam. Moreover, 
Azerbaijan recognizes equal rights to other religions such as Christians, Jews, and some other 
groups (Motika 2001; Hasanov 2011). Thus, Azerbaijan adopts the semblance of a secular 
structure and society. It follows also a secular education model (Hasanov 2011). From the 
viewpoint of the theories of modernity included in this study, Azerbaijan could be seen as a 
modern society that has considerably decreased the influence of religion in social life.  
Thus, the Azerbaijani modernity model presents a mixed version of development. The 
Azerbaijani people express that they have religious belongings to Islam but most are not 
religious in daily life. The majority of people do not practice religious duties and the society 
presents a secular appearance on the whole – akin to most contemporary European societies. 
In the education system, the country follows a strictly secular mode and there are a few 
religious centres that teach religious education. So at the social level, Azerbaijan could be 




Apart from MMP, as a critical approach towards the approaches put forward by the 
Eurocentric CMT and NMT, the Postcolonial Theory could also be considered as a suitable 
conceptual framework for this study. Postcolonial Theory challenges Eurocentric social 
theories and studies (Go 2016; Göksel 2018a), linear and universalist narratives of the West 
(Bush 2006: 96-98), and reconfigures dominant narratives to provide more adequate 
categories of analysis, where adequacy is measured in terms of increasing inclusivity and is 
oriented “backwards” as well as “forwards” (Bhambra 2007: 15; Göksel 2018a). However, 
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the Postcolonial Theory has not been adopted in this study because Azerbaijan was never a 
direct colony of Western empires and the Soviet rule differed from conventional colonialist 
governance model.  
According to CMT and NMT, contemporary Azerbaijan is not a modern country since 
it is not a developed industrial and liberal democratic state. However, this does not mean that 
Azerbaijan is a traditional agricultural and religious state/country. The growing role of oil and 
natural gas consumption in the world has increased the significance of Azerbaijan within the 
global economic system. From the last quarter of the 19
th
 century onwards, Azerbaijan‟s 
economy has depended on its natural resources and, even at the present, most of the state 
revenues depend on its natural resources. Developments in oil fields have also caused the 
industrialization of oil-related industries. However, other fields of industry have not 
developed as the oil and natural gas-related sectors have done. So it could be inferred that 
Azerbaijan is a semi-industrialized country at the economic level, resembling a classical 
rentier economy.  
Azerbaijan is a developing country in terms of economic sphere; however, its rapidly 
increasing economic welfare since 1991 has not yet contributed to the democratization of the 
country. Azerbaijan can be best understood as a nation “in transition” at the present. It would 
not be fully accurate to perceive Azerbaijan as a consolidated authoritarian state such as 
China and Saudi Arabia, because there are potentially influential opposition groups and – in 
fact – the ineffectiveness and/or disorganized state of the opposition parties enables the 
government to adopt a more unilateral/authoritarian decision-making mechanism. On the 
other hand, external powers, particularly Western governments such as the US, also support 
the incumbent government, so international support, in fact, strengthen the authoritarian 
tendencies of Baku. Thus, despite its recent economic development and ability to foster a 
sizable educated urban middle class, Azerbaijan has not fulfilled the democratization 
expectations of CMT and NMT so far – albeit countries with similar levels of socio-economic 
development such as Tunisia has made much progress on that front.   
The Azerbaijanis succeeded in establishing the first secular and democratic state in the 
Muslim world in 1918 but its natural development trajectory was interrupted by the invasion 
of the USSR in 1920. After gaining independence once again in 1991, the country has 
declared itself a Muslim and secular state. Although the numbers of mosques and people who 
practice daily rituals are gradually increasing; it is certain that Azerbaijanis are not going to 
transform to theocratic Iran and/or Arab countries practicing Sharia law. Most Azerbaijanis 
define themselves as Muslim and they believe that a religion is important. However, when it 
comes to practicing the obligations and rituals of the religion, the majority are not practising 
them, e.g. the daily prayers and fasting. It should be noted that the development of secular 
society is not just the consequence of the Soviet education system. This thesis could be 
supported by the fact that the Azerbaijani intelligentsia itself had already established a secular 
democratic republic prior to Soviet rule, a polity that granted universal suffrage to all its 
citizens regardless of ethnic identity and gender. In addition, contemporary Azerbaijan is a 
rare Muslim country that possesses an extremely high literacy rate that meets or exceeds the 
standards of many developed Western and East Asian societies. So, socially, the Azerbaijanis 
are secular but they also do not reject religion as CMT; secular lifestyle and religious 
consciousness exist simultaneously as NMT and MMP suggest. Since a modern society is one 
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that has experienced a process of transformation in the fields of political, economic and social 
development (Wagner 2012: 10), Azerbaijan could be accepted as modern today because it 
continually experiences change and transformation, from agricultural to capitalist, from 
capitalist to communist, and from communist to a post-communist mix of communism, 
capitalism and secular modern society that carries some element of religious and traditional 
practices. 
In summary, the Azerbaijani case presents a unique modernization experience and the 
process continues at the moment. It is not a liberal democratic polity, but economically a 
semi-developed and a socially secular country. The modernization process has not developed 
in Azerbaijan as CMT and NMT assume. Moreover, the modernization processes of many 
other non-Western countries (e.g. Turkey, Tunisia, Iran and Egypt) have not evolved as CMT 
and NMT predict either (Göksel 2018b). As an example of a post-Soviet Muslim country, 
Azerbaijan displays the unpredictable/divergent different track of modernization described by 
MMP, which is why MMP can be argued to offer the most effective approach to generalise 
and comprehend the phenomenon of modernization in the non-Western world. In addition, 
the post-Cold War developments in world politics and the success of various emergent 
models of political-economic development (e.g. Chinese state capitalism) are sufficient 
evidence to indicate that determining the modernity of a country is not a simple issue, and 
thus MMP is more successful than CMT and NMT in this regard. In the 21
st
 century, our 
understanding of modernization needs to ever-changing and flexible in parallel to the changes 
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